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Abstract: We address an argument by Floridi (2009, 2011), to the effect 
that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of 
presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational 
ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without 
commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing 
the topic in Section 1, in Section 2 we explain what the proposition 
expressed by the title of our paper means. In Section 3, we describe 
Floridi’s argument. In the following three Sections, we raise three 
difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not 
supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits 
(§ 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the 
world’s having parts (§ 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view 
entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make 
sense (§ 6). In Section 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s 
position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of 
identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus 
ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens. 
 
Keywords: Mereology; Mereological Composition; Digital Ontology; 
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1. Introduction1 
 
In recent important works Luciano Floridi (2009, 2011a) has raised an 
ingenious challenge for the proposition expressed by our title. The argument is 
at the core of Floridi’s two-stage project in informational ontology: a pars 
destruens highlighting the shortcomings of digital ontology, and a pars construens 
                                                
1 Between 2012 and 2013 parts of this paper were presented at the Philosophy Club at 
the University of St Andrews, at the Fifth Philosophy of Information Workshop at the 
University of Hertfordshire, and at the Ontology Workshop at the University of Milan-San 
Raffaele. We are grateful to the many persons who provided helpful comments and feedback 
in those occasions, and to two anonymous referees of this journal. 
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putting forth a new informational picture of reality, called “Informational 
Structural Realism” (ISR). 
Digital ontology is based on the claim that (DO) “The ultimate nature 
of reality is digital” (Floridi 2009, p. 151).2 For Floridi, DO is not entailed by 
information-inspired ontology as such: by showing that the former is “not a 
promising line of research” (Ibid, p. 176), we can set the stage for the 
development of the latter, as per Floridi’s ISR. 
DO as such may not imply pan-computationalism: the claim that the 
universe is a big Turing machine-like device (see Piccinini, 2010, § 3.1). In 
practice, digital ontologists generally conflate the two views, as in Ed Fredkin’s 
much-quoted Finite Nature Hypothesis:  
 
Finite Nature is a hypothesis that ultimately every quantity of physics, 
including space and time, will turn out to be discrete and finite; that the 
amount of information in any small volume of space-time will be finite 
and equal to one of a small number of possibilities. […] We take the 
position that Finite Nature implies that the basic substrate of physics 
operates in a manner similar to the workings of certain specialized 
computers called cellular automata. (Fredkin 1993, p. 116) 
 
Floridi’s strategy is notable: he does not aim at showing that reality is 
not a cellular automaton; nor does he claim that we cannot address the issue 
effectively, due to cognitive limitations. He attacks the very meaningfulness, or 
truth-aptitude, of the proposition that the world is either digital or analogue 
(henceforth: “D v A”). We should therefore clarify, to begin with, exactly what 
that proposition means. 
 
 
2. What “D v A” Means 
 
Firstly, “either… or… ”, “… v …”, is taken by us (as by Floridi: see 2009, p. 
160 and n. 16) as expressing ordinary disjunction. Secondly, the predicates “is 
digital” and “is analogue” are, just as for Floridi, a more fashionable way of 
expressing the same properties expressed by the traditional philosophical 
predicates “is discrete” and “is continuous” in “the age-old question about the 
discrete vs. continuous nature of reality” (Ibid, p. 152).  
                                                
2 Our approach to DO is described in Berto, Rossi and Tagliabue (2010). 
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Thirdly, “the world” just means the totality of things (Floridi himself 
mostly, though not always, uses the world “reality”). Perhaps the world is a big 
physical object. But perhaps “some parts of it are entelechies or spirits of auras 
or deities or other things unknown to physics”, as a philosopher once said.3 
Or, only slightly less controversially, maybe the world comprises also 
irreducibly abstract sets and set-like entities, such as recursive functions and 
groupoids. Perhaps it comprises also the abstract objects dear to many 
philosophers, like concepts, properties and relations; and maybe the latter kind 
of abstract object is reducible to the former. We take a dim view on this and 
allow ourselves plain talk of sets, properties, and relations, just as structural 
ontologists, as we shall see, generally do, and Floridi as well does in the 
aforementioned works. 
So let’s say that “the world” is to stand for the totality of the things or 
objects Floridi refers to when he talks of “reality”, however this is further 
characterized.4 What do “thing” or “object” mean here, then? The reply to this 
question is the absolutely crucial step in the current enquiry: most of the claims 
to follow in this work depend on it.  
We take a modest view on this as well – one, we submit, which any 
structuralist ontology currently on the market, including Floridi’s, is to accept. 
An object, at the very least, has properties and stands in relations. Because of 
this it may, as philosophers often say, satisfy certain predicates that express the 
properties or relations at issue or, equivalently, make true the corresponding 
sentences. This is what its objecthood consists in: 
 
An object is anything that can be the value of a variable, that is, anything we can 
talk about using pronouns, that is, anything. (Van Inwagen 2002, p. 180) 
 
So taken, “object” or “thing” are just unrestricted, maximally general 
terms (they stand for what Wittgenstein called a formal concept): “Every x is such 
                                                
3 Lewis (1986), p. 1. 
4 Some postmodern metaphysician, some philosopher of science of Kuhnian 
sympathies, or some advocate of the disunity of science such as Dupré (1993), may take such 
extremely different theories as Aristotle’s tà physikà, Newtonian mechanics, general relativity or 
quantum mechanics, as speaking of different worlds altogether and, perhaps because of this, as 
incommensurable. We set this issue aside, for it appears to be irrelevant to assess Floridi’s 
point. His structural realism is not a postmodern ontology: it is committed to the existence of a 
mind-independent reality populated by objects, as we are about to see. Several structuralists in 
the philosophy of science, in fact, invoke structuralism precisely as a vindication of realism in 
the face of radical theory change (see Worrall (1989), Saunders (2003), Ladyman (1998)). 
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that, if x is an object, then x is P” means nothing more and nothing less than 
“Every x is such that x is P”. And “Some x is such that x is an object and x is 
P” means nothing more and nothing less than “Some x is such that x is P”.  
That things are whatever bears properties and stands in relations, then, 
does not count as a full-fledged definition. Nor can one do much better when 
such fundamental notions come into play. For now, what is a property or a 
relation? Well, it is something things can bear or stand in. Then properties and 
relations count as things in their turn. They are things, in that they are bearers 
of (further) properties: as tall as has the property of partitioning the set of men 
into equivalence classes; divides has the property of being a partial ordering on 
+. Once being a thing is glossed just as being a property-bearer, one cannot 
think of anything which is not something, or some thing. 
May structural ontologies like ISR resist this minimal claim? In fact 
there are no self-subsistent individuals, a structural ontologist may say: 
individuals are just placeholders for stating things about structural relations and 
worldly patterns.  
But this doesn’t count as a rejection of our characterization. Even 
Ladyman and Ross’ Every Thing Must Go (2007), aside from the rhetorical force 
of its title, does not deny that there are things.5 What structural ontologists like 
Ladyman, Ross, or Floridi (seriously) deny is a specific, albeit (allegedly) 
pervasive, metaphysical conception of objects as bottom-level, self-subsistent 
individual substances with intrinsic natures independent from the relational 
structures they are embedded in. It may well be that the identity of things is 
nothing over and above the patterns or structural relations they enter into (so 
that Putnam’s paradox is dissolved: we can just individuate things up to 
isomorphism). This wouldn’t change that patterns or structural relations are, of 
course, things. They are objects of reference, property-bearers, standing in 
relations, subjects of true claims. We have it from the structuralists’ own 
mouths: 
 
There are objects in our metaphysics, but they have been purged of their 
intrinsic natures, identity, and individuality. […] Real patterns are the objects of 
genuine existential quantification. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 131 and p. 239) 
                                                
5 Well, sometimes it looks like it does: “we go on to deny that, strictly speaking, there 
are ‘things’” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 121); “there are no entities in the material mode 
according to us” (p. 186). But if one took take these claims at face value, one would have to 
consider their book plainly inconsistent, as we are about to see. 
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As a form of realism, ISR is committed to the existence of a mind-independent 
reality addressed by, and constraining, our knowledge. It supports […] a 
minimal ontological commitment in favour of the structural properties of reality 
and a reflective, equally minimal, ontological commitment in favour of structural 
objects. Unlike other versions of structural realism, ISR supports an 
informational interpretation of these structural objects. (Floridi 2009, p. 176) 
 
So structuralism, and in particular Floridi’s ISR, accepts ontological 
commitment to “structural objects” constituting reality in itself. We can even 
endorse the Kantian perspective proposed by Floridi,6 to be explored in greater 
detail below, that our theories or modes of presentation of reality can develop 
into better and better views insofar as they are 
 
increasingly informative about the relations that obtain between these (possibly 
sub-observable) informational objects that constitute the system under 
investigation (through the observable phenomena). (Ibid) 
 
These objects may be “noumenal” in some Kantian sense (“sub-
observable”, says Floridi). But these are the things the relevant modes of 
presentation of reality are about (“informative about the relations that obtain … 
system under investigation through the observable phenomena”). Floridi, as we 
just heard from him, quantifies on such sub-observable objects, and goes a 
long way towards characterizing them, speaking of them at length: they are 
“cohering clusters of data”, they are “mind-independent, concrete, relational 
points of lack of uniformity” (Ibid), etc. 
 
 
3.  The Thought Experiment Against DO 
 
“Either the world is discrete or continuous”, or “Reality is either digital or 
analogue”, according to Floridi are what Gilbert Ryle (1949, p. 16) would have 
                                                
6 Thanks to our anonymous referee #2 for pressing us on the importance of taking 
Floridi’s Kantian view seriously. This view, as based on a constructivist epistemology, is 
explained in a detailed way in Floridi 2011b, in the context of a general methodology for 
philosophical enquiry.  
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called a “category mistake”. The world or reality is not of the right kind for 
those predicates to truly or falsely apply to it: 
 
Both digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation of Being” (to 
paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced or 
conceptualised by an epistemic agent, at a given level of abstraction (LoA). 
They do not pick up some knowledge- or LoA-independent properties, 
intrinsic to the external world. […] It is not so much that reality in itself 
is not digital, but rather that, in a metaphysical context, the digital vs. 
analogue dichotomy is not applicable. (Floridi 2009, pp. 152, 159) 
 
“The world is either digital or analogue”, thus, should be like “The set 
 of rationals is either transparent or opaque”; or “The idea of beauty is either 
left- or right-handed”; or “This cobblestone is either odd or even”. Each of 
these grammatically well-formed claims is semantically deviant: a satzklang, as a 
neo-Positivist would have said. Each is plain false or, more likely, devoid of 
truth-value on the ground of its failing to express a proposition.  
The argument for this runs as follows. If DO holds, that is, “If the 
ultimate nature of reality in itself is digital, this implies that it is either digital or 
analogue” (Floridi 2009, p. 160). So once we show that the entailed disjunction 
is flawed, DO is refuted by reductio. To pursue this, two Floridi-steps are made: 
 
(F1) He provisionally grants D v A, but shows that an agent can never 
know that DO is true. 
 
(F2) He claims that the result in (F1) is not just an epistemic limitation: it 
is due to the nature of the concepts at hand. Digital and analogue are 
features of modes of presentation of reality, not of reality, and the 
initial concession in (F1) must be withdrawn. (see Floridi 2009, p. 
160) 
 
“‘x is P’ is a category mistake” arguably entails “An agent cannot know that x is 
P”. A category mistake is either plainly false or, more probably, truth-valueless. 
But one can only know true things. Therefore, (F2) alone would suffice for the 
desired conclusion. That Floridi puts forward (F1) is important, though: we 
will come to this in Section 6.  
The full-fledged argument is an ornate 11-page long thought 
experiment involving four angels, Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, and Uriel, who 
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actually are idealized Turing machine-like cognitive agents standing in various 
relations. The idea is that a cognitive agent, presented with an analogue model 
of reality, cannot possibly tell from this whether reality is analogue. For 
convenience, we rephrase the experiment in less elaborate but still theologically 
inspired terms: 
 
(1) God chooses to create U, a universe which is in itself either digital, or 
analogue (as it pleases the Lord). 
(2) Whether U is in itself digital or analogue, it gets translated into an 
“analogue world of experience”, AU, trough a digital-to-analogue 
reality converter. 
(3) The analogue translation AU of U is presented to an observer, the 
relevant cognitive agent, deemed incapable of detecting the intrinsic 
(digital or non-digital) nature of U as imposed in (1). 
 
We are asked to imagine a universe which prima facie looks analogue (as 
ours does), and to consider if an answer to the following question is, in 
principle, possible: “Is our universe intrinsically analogue?”.  
Floridi supports (3) by relying on the idea of “Levels of Abstractions”, 
a tool borrowed from computer science (see de Roever and Engelhardt 1998, 
Hoare and He 1998, Floridi 2011a, pp. 46-79). Any observer trying to make 
sense of an analogue system, such as AU, may produce infinitely many models 
or representations of varying ontological granularity (i.e., abstractness in the 
predicates they use to characterize the system): 
 
Analogue systems are closed under modelling at levels of abstraction, or, which is 
the same thing, there is no finite number of levels of abstractions that 
can provide all possible models of an analogue system. (Floridi 2009, p. 
167) 
 
A potential problem with the argument so far: when in (2) U is 
translated into an analogue version, a new ontological layer L is produced 
starting from U. L is analogue and is presented to the observer in (3) (see 
Figure 2 in Floridi 2009). According to Floridi, if U is analogue an observer 
will never halt the production of models, never knowing the true nature of 
reality – but what if U is digital (which cannot be denied beforehand to the 
supporter of DO, on pain of begging the question against him)?  
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If our world is digital, what we experience cannot be a truly analogue L, 
just a seemingly analogue L. If our world is digital there is no way to store 
continuous information within it. Therefore, the models that can be produced 
are not infinite since the target system is not analogue: we may know, after all, 
that we live in a digital world. This is a collateral issue anyway; for (F1) does 
indeed little, if anything, to establish (F2), as Floridi acknowledges:  
 
Once Raphael (the epistemic agent) is shown to be unable to establish 
the digital (or analogue) nature of reality in itself, one still needs to 
answer the objection according to which this conclusion, even if granted, 
shows nothing about the actual nature of reality in itself. (Floridi 2009, p. 
161) 
 
But the scenario in (F1) is supposed to be useful to better understand 
why (F2) holds, once we add the final step in the argument: 
 
(4) It is possible to use digital-to-analogue and analogue-to-digital 
converters to switch the nature of the layer presented to the observer, 
disregarding the question whether U itself was digital or analogue in 
the first place. 
 
To vindicate (4), Floridi asks us to imagine his final angel Uriel building 
a “wheel” (Ibid, p. 169-170) with four nodes made by digital-to-analogue and 
analogue-to-digital converters: 
 
 
    
Digital Ontology → DAC 
 
 ADC 
  Uriel  
 
Analogue Ontology → 
 
ADC 
  
DAC 
    
 
 
The system generated by the wheel will be perceived by the observer as 
either digital or analogue depending on the observer’s position with respect to 
 9 
the wheel: “It is now obvious that it makes no sense to ask whether the system 
is digital or analogue in itself.” (Ibid, p. 169).  
Given (4), Floridi can round up the argument with the Kantian 
conclusion: 
 
At this point, the doubt that naturally comes to one’s mind is whether 
the analogue/continuous vs. digital/discrete dichotomy may be sound at 
all, or at least whether its application to the description of the intrinsic 
nature of reality may not be misguided. Kant thought it was. And I agree 
that it is. Analogue/continuous and digital/discrete are modes of 
presentation of Being, i.e. ways in which a system is modelled 
(experienced or conceptualised) by an observer (an epistemic agent) at a 
given level of abstraction. (Ibid, p. 168) 
 
From now on, we focus on the consequences of the conclusion: how must the 
world be like, if “D v A” is a category mistake? We show, via three objections, 
that the world ends up in bad shape. 
 
 
4. Intuitions? 
 
Out first objection is ad hominem (thus weaker than the ones to follow it, which 
are not). As we are about to see, Floridi occasionally resorts to the practice and 
shared beliefs of scientists to explain his point. However, it is doubtful that 
they would follow him down his path. To be sure: we are not relying on shared 
beliefs or intuitions in defence of DO, or of the claim expressed by the title of 
our paper. For we do not believe that intuitions or beliefs matter much in 
issues of fundamental ontology.7 Rather, we argue that the very intuitions 
referred to by Floridi in his paper and book don’t lend support to his claim 
that “D v A” makes for a category mistake. 
There is a prima facie big difference between such claims as “  is either 
transparent or opaque”, or “This cobblestone is either odd or even”, and 
“Reality is either discrete or continuous”. The semantic deviancy of the former 
claims is patent; not so for the latter. Debating whether our world is Life-like or 
                                                
7 Thanks to our anonymous referee #1 for pressing us to clarify this point. 
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not8 and debating whether this cobblestone is odd or even seem to be quite 
different things: the latter is patent nonsense; the former apparently targets a 
real, substantive, structural (in the sense of Sider 2012)9 difference concerning 
reality. It is so taken by the vast majority of theoretical physicists and scientists. 
But even if one resorted to the scientists’ intuitions as having some value, these 
would not deliver a clear verdict in addressing the D v A-issue. Some infer 
from the digital nature of their favourite models of the physical world to the 
digital nature of the physical world itself, while others refrain from such a 
conclusion. In the former party, there are authors like Konrad Zuse (1982) and 
the Nobel prize winner Gerard ‘t Hooft (1997). Approaches based on causal 
set theory (see Sorkin 1995, Dowker 2003, Malament 2006) take the geometry 
of real-world spacetime as such that at the Planck length (10-33 cm) it is 
discrete. Cognate strategies take spacetime as made of polysimplexes, usually 
polidimensional counterparts of tetrahedra (see Ambjorn et al. 2004). 
Other researchers, probably the majority of them, as Floridi stresses (see 
Floridi 2009, p. 159), are just against the idea of a digital world – for instance, 
another Nobel laureate, Steven Weinberg. Deutsch (2005) and Hardy (2005) 
reject the view that quantum probabilities and quantum computing vindicate a 
discrete structure of spacetime, and claim that quantum mechanics complies 
with the idea that the world is continuous even more than classical physics.  
An inference from our best discrete or analogue models or theories or 
representations of reality to the discrete or analogue nature of reality itself may 
just be an inference to the best explanation. The scientists who refrain from 
performing such inference (Floridi lists Toffoli 2003, on the basis of quoting 
Toffoli’s “a non frivolous aspect of this Digital Perspective is its heuristic 
capacity”, p. 147) are, of course, logically allowed to: for it is not deductively, at 
most abductively, warranted. One may take our best physical theory to be an 
analogue (digital) one, and refrain from declaring that the world is analogue 
(digital), taking the theory only as a “useful model” of reality – in whatever 
sense of that frustrating phrase, so often used as a deus ex machina to avoid 
further bothersome questions.  
                                                
8 See Berto and Tagliabue (2012) for a philosophically oriented introduction to Life, 
probably the most popular cellular automaton; the locus classicus is Berlekamp, Conway and Guy 
(1982). 
9 Sider uses the term in the context of an extension of David Lewis’ theory of natural 
properties: substantive ontological questions are those about structural features of reality, 
questions “to be cast in perfectly joint-carving terms” (Sider 2012, p. 46). 
 11 
Which does not change that theorists generally take the question, “D v 
A?”, “Is the physical world discrete or analogue?”, as perfectly meaningful. 
When they resist the abductive inference, they typically do so on 
methodological grounds. They may even do so on the basis of a 
philosophically much more committing scepticism on the possibility of 
knowing the ultimate nature of reality. But they rarely, if ever, resist the 
inference on the ground that it would commit one to a category mistake: to the 
misapplication of such concepts as discrete or continuous to something of the 
wrong kind. They do not take, that is, “is discrete” or “is continuous” as 
standing for properties that meaningfully (truly or falsely) apply only to 
theories, models, or modes of presentation of reality. In general, neither the 
digital-friendly, nor the digital-unfriendly, nor the neutrals quoted by Floridi, 
seem to vindicate his view. This, in our opinion, holds also for Turing, quoted 
by Floridi again (2009, p. 168) as somehow supporting his view: 
 
The digital computers […] may be classified amongst the “discrete state 
machines”, these are the machines which move by sudden jumps or 
clicks from one quite definite state to another. These states are 
sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to be 
ignored. Strictly speaking there are no such machines. Everything really moves 
continuously [Floridi’s emphasis]. But there are many kinds of machine, 
which can profitably be thought of as being discrete state machines. 
(Turing 1950, p. 439) 
 
Machines, says Turing, can often be usefully modelled as discrete. They 
can, that is, be represented as digital, and these theories, or representations, are 
profitable. But the world in itself is analogue (“Strictly speaking […] everything 
really moves continuously”). Turing is asserting that reality itself is analogue, 
that is, not digital, though it can be profitably represented as digital. 
 
 
5. The Parts of the World 
 
The argument from scientists’ beliefs works only ad hominem: its is not 
independently appealing to us. Who cares about scientists’ intuitions in this 
case? The D v A-issue is head-on philosophical. We don’t expect the solution, 
or dissolution, of such a fundamental metaphysical problem as the labyrinth of 
the continuum to take care of the intuitions of possibly philosophically naïve 
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scientists. Scientists developing physical theories have no special authority on 
their metaphysical interpretation. 
Our second argument addressing Floridi’s view, then, leaves aside the 
ad hominem move of turning his appeal to Turing and others against him. It 
stresses, instead, that such view is incompatible with the world’s having parts, 
which is hard to swallow. The objection, therefore, calls mereology into play. 
Specialists take mereology as a most general and, in this sense, “formal” 
ontological theory (contrast “material ontology”, in Husserl’s sense). 
Mereology spells out the principles governing the notion of parthood for stuff 
of any kind. It has been developed as a nominalistic alternative to set theory 
and, according to philosophers like Lewis (1991), mereology can be used in 
place of ZF(C) for the foundation of mathematics. But its application is largely 
independent from issues concerning realism and nominalism (in the 
philosophy of mathematics, and elsewhere). Combined with standard topology 
into mereotopology, it can be readily applied to spatiotemporal representation 
to yield a neat, rigorous formal treatment (see e.g. Casati and Varzi 1999).  
Let parthood be expressed by a dyadic predicate, P. Some mereological 
axioms are uncontroversial,10 for they fix the mere lexical meaning of P. 
Parthood should be a nonstrict partial ordering:  
 
(A1) ∀xPxx 
(A2) ∀x∀y(Pxy ∧ Pyx → x = y) 
(A3) ∀x∀y∀z(Pxy ∧ Pyz → Pxz) 
 
Any thing x is part of itself, any part of any part of x is part of x, etc. 
Other principles governing composition (the existence of wholes given the 
parts) and decomposition (the existence of parts given the wholes) are more 
controversial – to mention a famous one, unrestricted fusion: is it so that for 
any x and y there’s a z whose parts are exactly whatever is part of x or part of 
y? Some say yes, others are firmly opposed.11 
Now here’s another controversial issue in this area. Start with the 
definition of atom: 
 
                                                
10 Or almost so: see e.g. Cotnoir and Bacon (2012) for a perspective rejecting 
antisymmetry, yielding a non-wellfounded mereology. We leave this option aside, for it doesn’t 
threaten our argument.  
11 See for example Lewis (1986), Sider (2001), Casati, Varzi (1999) for the yes-side, 
and van Inwagen (1990), Simons (1987), Koslicki (2008) for the no-side. 
 13 
(Adef) Ax =df~∃yPPyx 
 
(Where “PPxy” stands for proper parthood, the strict ordering defined from 
parthood, the usual way: PPxy =df Pxy ∧ ~Pyx). An atom is a mereological 
simple: it has no proper parts.  
Are there any? Perhaps there are no atoms, that is, everything is 
divisible in infinitum (“gunky”, as Lewis said). Or perhaps everything is in the 
end made of atoms. In the former case, we accept the following as true: 
 
(Gunk)  ∀x∃yPPyx 
 
In the latter case, we accept the following as true: 
 
(Atom)  ∀x∃y(Ay ∧ Pyx) 
 
(Gunk) and (Atom) are contraries: they cannot be true together, but 
they leave room for intermediate positions. Perhaps space-time is continuous 
but the mereology of material objects is discrete:  
 
(GunkSpace)  ∀x(σx → ∃yPPyx) 
(AtoMatter)   ∀x(µx → ∃y(Ay ∧ Pyx))  
 
… Where only space-time regions and material beings satisfy σ and µ, 
respectively (this may happen, if mereological simplicity is not tied to lack of 
spatial extension: see Simons 2004, Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2006). 
Now principles such as these (modulo the expressive limitations on 
cardinality of standard mereology’s first order language) are enough to express 
how Life-like, Finite Nature-like, or Newton-like universes substantially differ 
in many ways. For instance:  
 
• (Atom) is a natural way to phrase the key claim of DO, that “reality can be 
decomposed into ultimate, discrete indivisibilia” (Floridi 2009, p. 153). 
 
• Any finite world is atomistic, so if (Atom) fails, then Fredkin’s Finite 
Nature hypothesis is false. 
 
• A fortiori, an atomless world where (Gunk) holds has infinitely many 
things. 
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Schaffer (2003) has argued that science offers no evidence that (Atom) 
is true of the physical world. Nolan (2004) has discussed the issue in a general 
setting. Now for the key question (of interest to us): What do the variables in 
(Atom), (Gunk), (GunkSpace), (AtoMatter), range over? It is to say the least 
implausible to claim that: 
 
(a) In (A1)-(A3), our variables range on worldly things, that is, bits of 
reality in itself; whereas, 
(b) When we discuss more controversial principles, like (Atom), (Gunk), 
etc., we have an unspotted category switch (a metábasis eis állo génos, in 
Aristotelian terms), and we end up talking of modes of presentation of 
reality, or features of levels of abstraction; so that if we believe we are 
still talking of – quantifying over bits of – reality in itself, we are victims 
of a category mistake.  
 
Thus, we should reject (a): we were talking of features of modes of 
presentation of reality from the start. The lexical axioms for parthood (A1)-
(A3) are about modes of presentation of being, not about reality in itself. Such 
modes of presentation are what actually is in the range of the relevant 
quantifiers. This amounts to denying that parthood relations are objective 
features of the world: out there in reality, parthood does not apply.  
To reject the worldly meaningfulness of the D v A-issue, one needs 
parthood relations not to be features of reality (and not even in the minimal sense of 
Rosen and Dorr’s 2002 mereological nihilism: if there are only atoms, DO is 
vindicated by default already). We find this rather implausible.  
Perhaps the implausibility may be tempered on the following grounds. 
In a structural world, the structural ontologist may retort, there is no unique 
notion of parthood that applies unrestrictedly to the whole of reality. Relational 
structures making for reality in itself can obviously admit various form of 
composition (take coalesced sum for lattices, for instance). They can also admit 
various forms of decomposition, that is, they also have substructures (take e.g. 
endomorphisms). Just like Aristotle’s being, however, in a structural world 
mereological (de)composition is spoken of in many ways. 
Of course, structures and patterns enter into lots of relations that are 
uncontroversially partial orderings. But being a partial order, the structuralist 
may retort, is far too lax a requirement for a relation to qualify as parthood.  
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On the other hand, of the many partial orderings around that enjoy 
further parthood-like features (e.g., satisfying formal principles that correspond 
to mereological weak supplementation, or strong supplementation, etc.), there 
is none of which we can say that it is the one qualifying as the parthood 
relation, grounding a single notion of decomposition for reality, which may 
either digitally come to an end, or serially go on forever.12 
We doubt, however, that the worldly meaningfulness of the D v A-
issue presupposes even this. For assume that in reality there are only patterns 
or relational structures, that is, as we heard structuralists themselves claim, that 
“real patterns are the objects of genuine existential quantification”. Some notion 
of structural analysis of patterns or structures into subpatterns or substructures 
is just enough for the D v A-issue to be perfectly meaningful of the world. For 
one can ask: Is such analysis a serial relation? That is, do relations go all the 
way down? If yes, the world is analogue; if not, not. 
And structural realists do need such a notion of structural analysis.  
It is a common remark on structuralism that structural relations simply 
make no sense unless there are relata standing in such relations: see e.g. Dorato 
(2000), Psillos (2001), Esfeld (2004), Morganti (2004) – and many others. 
Floridi (2003) himself argues against a radically eliminativist version of 
structural realism, which simply denies that there are relata. As we have seen, 
according to Floridi there are indeed (structural) mind-independent objects 
constituting reality in itself: (structural) property-bearers, standing in various 
relations.  
Serious structuralism, then, does not deny the existence of the things 
that are the relata. But there is an analysis relation on patterns, a (multigrade?) 
relation that works serially. We have it, again, from the structuralists’ mouth – 
let us listen to Ladyman and Ross: 
 
 While there are relata, they can be analysed into further relational structure 
themselves. [...] The relata of a given relation always turn out to be relational 
structures themselves on further analysis. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 152 and 
p. 155) 
                                                
12 “Why suppose that there is any such thing [as a unique parthood relation]? It is 
supposed to be the relation that obtains between parts of any whole, but the wholes mentioned 
above are hugely disparate and the composition relations studied by the special sciences are sui 
generis. We have no reason to believe that an abstract composition relation is anything other 
than an entrenched philosophical fetish.” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 21) 
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So given a thing x  (an “object of genuine existential quantification”, 
that is, a real pattern or structural object), there always are relational structures 
into which x is analysed. Then the analysis relation works serially: indeed “it’s 
relations all the way down” (Ibid, p. 152).  
Then there is no complete analytic decomposition for patterns. This is 
certainly gunky, that is, “non-atomistic metaphysics.” (p. 190): 
 
 Life differs greatly from the universe with respect to the kinds of reductionism 
sustainable in it. Life admits of complete decomposition: the universe does not. 
(Ibid, p. 201)13 
 
 
6. The Number of Things 
 
For our third objection, we resort to Floridi’s own understanding of how the 
issue whether the world is digital or analogue should be understood. This is 
where step (F1) of his argument, where he provisionally concedes that the 
world might be either digital or analogue, comes handy. 
Once “world”, “thing” or “object”, “digital” and “analogue” have been 
understood as per Section 2, the D v A-issue may boil down to a question 
about the number of things. As such Floridi, very correctly, presents it. In his 
step (F1) (see Floridi 2009, Section 3.1), he describes Michael’s (his first 
angel’s) epistemic position, which is like the one of God in our rephrasing of 
his thought experiment in Section 3: Michael “enjoys a God’s eye view of 
reality in itself” (Ibid, p. 162).  
Michael shapes the stuff constituting reality by applying a total ordering 
on it, so that the result can be represented as a line. Then Michael uses his 
                                                
13 And many other typical mereological issues make perfect sense in a structural 
world. Take again the problem of unrestricted mereological composition: given any two 
objects x and y, is their mereological fusion automatically given? Some say yes, other say no, as 
we have seen. Now given any two real patterns x and y, is there a real pattern automatically 
obtained by conjoining them? (Some) structural ontologists deny this, on the basis of their 
conditions for pattern existence: “The object named by ‘my left nostril and the capital of 
Namibia and Miles Davis’ last trumpet solo’ is not a real pattern, because identification of it 
supports no generalizations not supported by identification of the three conjuncts considered 
separately.” (Ibid, p. 231) 
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maximally sharp sword to Dedekind-cut the line, i.e., to figuratively map reality 
via Dedekind cuts to the real number line:  
 
When it cuts (i.e., intersects) the line, it divides it into two disjoint, non-
empty parts, left and right. If the point at which the sword cuts the line 
belongs to either the left or the right half, then that point corresponds to 
a rational number. If the point belongs to neither (if neither subset of the 
rationals contains it), then it corresponds to an irrational number. (Ibid, 
p. 162) 
 
Emblematic representation aside, Michael is counting: working towards 
establishing the number of things. Take the totality of things in the world. If 
such a totality is in one-to-one correspondence with , then the world is 
analogue, A: reality is dense and continuous.14 If not, that is, if some points in 
the line are missing, then the world is digital, D: either it’s not dense, or it is 
but still it’s enumerable, that is, equinumerous with .  
Now the D v A-issue boils down to this: either there are finitely-or-
denumerably-many things, or not. Thus, “D v A” can be a category mistake, 
only if it makes no sense to speak of the total number of things. Take reality, 
or the world: the collection of all the (relevant, structural, etc.) objects. How 
many of them are there (countably many, uncountably many)?  
How can this question originate a satzklang? This is not for us a 
rhetorical issue: we conjecture in the next Section that the question may be 
ultimately nonsensical, as Floridi wants. The purpose of this Section is to set 
up the conditions under which that question may fail to make sense.15 
The question, notice, does not depend for its making sense on worldly 
stuff’s making for a linear order. One could reject a well-ordering principle for 
worldly stuff, and request a weakening the assumption in step (F1), on the 
basis of considerations from contemporary physics.16 For instance, it might be 
that worldly stuff cannot even be partially, thus a fortiori linearly, ordered: for 
Saunders (2003), (2006), fermions are only weakly discernible as standing in 
                                                
14 Floridi leaves aside the issue whether such a totality may have a larger cardinality 
for this is irrelevant: if it reaches the continuum, that’s enough as far as his point is concerned. 
15 Thanks to our anonymous referee #1 for suggesting that we make this point 
explicit. 
16 We mention this only en passant, for Floridi (2003) speaks against letting quantum-
theoretic considerations, e.g., from the phenomenon of entanglement, teach us lessons in 
general ontology; so he may be resilient to remarks of this kind anyway. 
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irreflexive relations, and they may not be enumerated. They can, however, be 
counted: Krause (1992), Dalla Chiara et al. (1998) have developed set-theoretic 
frameworks in which quanta can be gathered into sets with no ordinal, but 
with cardinal. 
How can it be nonsensical to ask the question of how many things 
there are, “thing” or “object” being, recall, just blanket terms for any property-
bearer, anything that can be the value of a variable, that is, anything? To 
rephrase the point with the help of van Inwagen: once “thing” is understood in 
the minimal sense outlined in Section 2, given that we have the amount of 
space and time Floridi’s angels have as idealized cognitive agents, we can write 
down “a sentence that expresses any of the propositions in the following 
infinite sequence” (van Inwagen 2002, p. 186):  
 
There is nothing; 
There is exactly one thing; 
There are exactly two things; 
There are exactly three things; 
… 
 
At most one of the claims in the sequence will be true, and that one true 
sentence gives the number of things.  
Or, none of them is true, for there are infinitely many things. In the 
latter case, given the bits of transfinite arithmetic in Floridi’s Michael example, 
we can claim of any number K that K is the number of things. We say: “There 
is a set of things, U, such that |U| = K, and no number larger than K is the 
cardinal of any set of things”.  
Or, if we don’t even accept those bits of transfinite arithmetic, we 
cannot say what the number of things is, but we can say they are innumerable: 
“For any number K, there are at least K + 1 things.”  
At which point of this reasoning by cases do we hit a meaningless 
satzklang or dead end? We can only think of two ways in which this may 
happen – two ways in which Floridi may be right. As we shall see in the next 
Section, however, neither makes for a promising world view. 
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7. Ways Out for ISR? 
 
The first way in which the D v A-question may now be ill-posed is in the 
presence of what are usually called vague identity relations: for some things a 
and b, it is de re indeterminate whether a = b or not. If so, there is no answer to 
the question of what the number of things is, for it is de re indeterminate 
whether, when we take a and b into account, we have to count one thing or 
two. If there are vague identity relations, there are vague objects, namely those 
that stand in such vague relations.  
There being de re vague objects can, in fact, pose difficulties also for the 
mereological framework rehearsed by us above, since arguably many 
supposedly vague entities are vague precisely because of their vague parts – 
clouds, forests, heaps of sand, mountains:  
 
What are the mereological boundaries of a desert, a river, a mountain? 
Some stuff is positively part of Mount Everest and some stuff is 
positively not part of it, but there is borderline stuff whose mereological 
relationship to Everest seems indeterminate. (Varzi 2009, § 5) 
 
Other philosophers (Sainsbury 1989, Tye 2000) have challenged this 
thread of thought. Vague objects can be “mereologically elusive”, but they still 
have as precise identity conditions as any other object. For suppose that 
parthood is fuzzy – it comes in degrees. Still one can say that a = b iff they have 
the same parts to the same degree. And these are perfectly crisp identity 
conditions, as Williamson (1994) already stressed in his book on vagueness. 
Moreover, on most plausible ways of spelling out this ontic indeterminacy at 
the formal level, the core of our mereological argument using (Atom), (Gunk), 
etc., in order to spell out the D v A-issue would still be intact (see Varzi 2009, 
§5, for a discussion of the main alternatives). 
The second way in which the D v A-question may be ill-posed is in 
case identity is sortal-relative and not Leibnizian, i.e., it defies Leibniz’s Law or 
the Indiscernibility of Identicals. In this case, “a = b” does not express a 
complete, truth-evaluable proposition, unless we take it as implicitly including 
some sortal restriction. It makes no sense to wonder if a and b are one or two, 
simpliciter. What does make sense is to wonder whether a and b are the same F, 
where “F” stands for some sortal predicate. But their being the same F does 
not entail congruence with respect to all features, in particular their being the 
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same G, where “G” stands for some different sortal predicate (see Geach 1967, 
Deutsch 1998). 
We take both of these views, namely that there are objects which are 
vague because of their standing in vague identity relations, and that identity is 
sortal-relative and not Leibnizian, as problematic on logical and metaphysical 
grounds. We will not spell out our motivations here, for the following reason: 
even if such doctrines were true, it is not (yet) clear to us how Floridi’s ISR 
may appeal to them to vindicate the view that the D v A-issue is ill-posed 
because “D v A” is a satzklang. Are some of Floridi’s structural objects, with 
their properties and structural relations, vague and such that they stand in 
vague identity relations? Perhaps this can be motivated via considerations from 
(the philosophy of) quantum physics, to the effect that quantum field theories 
defy the idea that there always is a determinate number of things at least for 
things of some kind (say bosons, if not fermions; but again, Floridi (2003) 
seems to speak against taking this route).  
Or is perhaps the identity of such objects, as supervening to the net of 
structural relations they are involved in, sortal-relative and non-Leibnizian? 
Whether Floridi’s structural objects could be vague or sortal-relative is an issue 
to be addressed in another paper, after a more thorough examination of the 
pars construens of Floridi’s ambitious project. It is enough for us to notice that, if 
this were the way to go for him to declare that the world is neither digital nor 
analogue, it would involve tampering with the logical features of identity as the 
smallest reflexive relation entailing congruence with respect to all properties. It 
may involve challenging Leibniz’s Law or the Indiscernibility of Identicals itself 
– the Law of which Kripke notoriously claimed that it is as self-evident as the 
Law of Non-Contradiction: a route which will look discouraging to most 
logicians and ontologists, and certainly to us. 
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